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National security, in its broadest sense, is defined in two
dimensions, objectives and capabilities. 1

Both dimensions are

identified in external and internal domains which are distinct
but interdependent.

The national security bill introduced into

the Romanian Senate in early 1991 reflects this analytical
framework:
Romania's national security is seen, as it is
conceived by the initiators of the bill, as the
ensurance and consolidation of the social, economic and
political stability required by the existence and
development of the state of law, of the country's
sovereignty, independence and integrity, [and] of the
climate for the exercise of the citizens' fundamental
rights and freedoms. National security is ensured by
knowing, preventing and removing internal and external
threats that can harm all the value protected by law. 2
Whatever the alleged continuities between Ceau~escu's
Romania and post-revolutionary Romania, the discontinuity in
national security strategies is apparent.

Post-revolutionary

Romania has, through its foreign policy achievements and the
publicly articulated positions of President Ion Iliescu, former
Prime Minister Petre Roman, and Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase,
radically reoriented its concept of national security away from a
semi-isolationist, autarkic (or at least neo-mercantilist) and
revisionist policy distance from the "old world order" toward a
cooperatist, interdependent and "status quo" identification with
the "new world order."

Such a reorientation has required a

concurrent restructuring of the military, diplomatic and other
means of achieving security goals.

Thus far, changes in the

means have not kept pace with changes in orientation.
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For more than two decades Romania was the Soviet bloc's odd
man out:

calling for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (along

with that of NATO); refusing to allow ground maneuvers on its
territory and to participate significantly in similar exercises
in other member-states; rejecting Soviet calls for increased
military spending; diversifying its sources of arms while
building up an arms industry of its own; declining to send its
military officers to Soviet command and staff schools; and,
formulating its own military doctrine and implementing
territorial defense policies inconsistent with the coalition
warfare doctrines of the Pact. 3

Similar to France's relationship

with NATO, Romania continued to be an active and often
obstreperous participant in the Warsaw Pact's political
deliberations while refusing to compromise national control of
its armed forces, the ultimate means of maintaining national
security against any potential foe.

The Ceau~escu regime thus

benefited from the Pact's proven guarantee of party-regimes'
continuation in power as well as against any non-Soviet external
threat to its sovereignty while avoiding the internally
delegitimizing loss of autonomy fuller participation would have
implied.
Romania's relationship with the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) was hardly more consistent with bloc norms.
the 1960s and 1970s Romania diversified its foreign markets and
suppliers and declined to participate in CMEA projects deemed
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In

unacceptably integrationist.

However, the adoption of austerity

measuries in the early 1980s and Romania's increasing political
isolation, the result of the Ceau~escu regime's abysmal human
rightj record, forced a partial reorientation of Romanian foreign
trade ltoward the CMEA, particularly the Soviet Union. 4
Jeither were the Romanian Communist Party's relationships
with the Soviet and other European ruling parties harmonious
either before or after the soviet leadership changes of the mid1980s.

Contacts with other "independent" ruling parties, such as

those of China, Yugoslavia and North Korea, were nurtured in an
initially successful effort to acquire non-Soviet ideological
legitimacy.

After M. s. Gorbachev•s succession to the Soviet

party's leadership, Ceau~escu•s position became even more
isolatingly Stalinist than it had been before.

He continued to

decry Gorbachev•s reformism until he was overthrown.
Significantly, not only did Ceau~escu's Romania pursue
autonomous foreign and national security policies, but the Soviet
Union allowed Romania to pursue those policies.

Romanian

deviations were never more than annoying to the Soviet
leadership.

One might even argue that probable Soviet complicity

in Romania's vaunted autonomy strengthened an otherwise
incompetent regime, lending it nationalist legitimacy in the
absence of material and spiritual inducements for popular
support. 5

-
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Romanian autonomy also benefited from the West's economic
and diplomatic support.

The West's, and particularly the United

States•, policies of "differentiation" rewarded Romania's
security policy deviations from the bloc norm with significant
economic assistance and splashy diplomatic visits.

The trade-off

for whatever benefits might have been derived from fuller
cooperation with the Soviet bloc was deemed more than adequate
compensation and entailed few if any Romanian risks.

While the

Ceau 9 escu regime's escalating human rights abuses were nervously
noted in the West in the late 1970s, it was not until the
austerity program of the 1980s had created substantial Romanian
trade surpluses and had darkened Romanian streets and emptied
markets and until Ceau 9 escu's personality cult had reached
pharonic proportions that the West terminated its support of the
regime.

At that point full reintegration into the bloc was not

possible given the incompatibility of Gorbachev•s reformist
expectations and Ceau 9 escu•s stubborn Stalinism.

Reliance on

extra-bloc support from the West, the non-Soviet East and much of
the South was no longer a viable alternative.

Ceau 9 escu's

Romania, which had once manipulated its international prestige to
garner domestic legitimacy, was, in the end, isolated from both
the East and the West; a international pariah, denied external
support of its security and ever more reliant upon the
"Securitate" and other domestic instruments of coercion for
perpetuation of a thoroughly incompetent and corrupt regime.

-
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Ceau 9 escu's concept of national security ultimately led to
Romania's isolation.

Rejecting economic interdependence with

either the East or the West, he pursued trade and financial
policies incompatible with Romania's resources, devastating a
richly endowed country and impoverishing an industrious work
force.

Refusing to meet the West's standards of human rights or

the East's expectations of acceptable alliance behavior,
Ceau 9 escu placed too great a burden on national capabilities for
external and internal security.

The revolutionary environment of

1989 thus furnished the occasion rather than the cause of the
Ceau 9 escu regime's downfall.
The consequences of Ceau 9 escu's concept of national security
on the Romanian armed forces were substantial.

As stipulated in

the Law on National Defense (1972) 6 , the Romanian military was
strictly subordinated to the RCP, and thus to Ceau9 escu himself,
through a Defense Council.

Identifying the Soviet Union and

other Warsaw Pact member-states as the most probable adversaries,
Romanian military doctrine, "the whole nation's war," based its
defensive and deterrent strategies on the survivability of small,
lightly armed and territorially based "patriotic guard" units,
the hit-and-run tactics of which would render the costs of
prolonged occupation greater than its potential benefits.
Defensive self-reliance implied the establishment of an adequate
but "low tech" arms industry and a proportional reduction in the
acquisition ,of relatively expensive foreign military technology.

-
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Territorial defense also diffused the exclusive competence of the
professional military, a deprofessionalization compounded by the
regime's use of military labor in the general economy.

Despite

the appeal of the policies' inherent anti-Russian and antiHungarian nationalisms, the demoralizing consequences of
technological backwardness and deprofessionalization coupled with
the politicization of promotion and the penetration of the armed
I

forces by the ubiquitous "Securitate," apparently triggered a
number of military plots against the regime. 7

"Unreliable"

officers went unpromoted or were pensioned off early.

Ceau 9 escu

sycophants "earned" quick promotions to jobs they were illprepared to fill.

Thus, at the time of the revolution, the

primary traditional instrumentality for implementing externally
oriented national security policies was demoralized, politicized,
poorly led and anachronistically equipped but probably marginally
equal to the tasks assigned to it.
The national economy was not a viable instrument for
achieving national security goals just prior to the revolution.
In March, 1989, Ceau 9 escu announced that Romania's external debt,
which had amounted to almost $11 billion in 1981, had been
completely eliminated.

What he did not announce was the

austerity program's halving Romania's standard of living, the
rapid depreciation of productive assets due to the choking off of
imported technology, and the pervasive foreign distrust of
Romania as a trade partner. 8

Autarky is a luxury afforded large

-
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resource-rich developed economies, not a pauperized Romania
slipping deeper into comparative underdevelopment.
Romanian statesmanship and diplomacy, once the admired
hallmark of the Soviet bloc's maverick regime, had, by the mid1980s, declined to international irrelevance~
longer commanded respect.

Ceau 9 escu no

His duplicitous foreign dealings were

no longer of value to either the East or the West.

Ceau9 escu

sycophants held important ambassadorial posts in spite of their
transparent incompetence.

Then again, brilliant statesmanship

was not required for a policy of evolving isolation.
Given the success of the revolution, even the internal
-··

security f orces--·the troops of the Ministry of the Interior,
the "Securitate," and the militia--were unreliable protectors'of the domestic order, much less the regime itself.
Regardless of one's opinion of the genuineness of the
Romanian revolution, the events of 1990 and 1991 have revealed a
distinctly different approach to national security. 9

One may

argue that this reorientation represents the opportunistic
machinations of the unreformed "nomenklaturist" leaders of the
National Salvation Front (NSF) desperately seeking external
economic assistance rather than a structured rejection of
nationalistic self-reliance. 10

Indeed, the international

community's willingness to accept Romania's new course at face
value is constrained by the relative incompleteness of domestic
change:

recurrent examples of interethnic conflict; heavy handed
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suppression of aissent; failure to remove former communist
officials from iositions of authority; hesitating marketization
and privatizati~n of the economy; restrictions on the media; and,
the reluctance bf both the NSF and the opposition to accept
.

I

Western standartls of democratic politics.

- I

Alternatel¥, one may see in post-revolutionary Romania's
national securiry and foreign policies a reclamation of the
interwar logic of Nicolae Titulescu whose memory Foreign Minister
Nastase seldom forgets to invoke.

Titulescu's policies were

based on the assumption of the insufficiency of Romania's
capabilities aJone and on the efficacy of legal and institutional
guarantees at Jhe bilateral, regional and global levels to
compensate for national deficiencies.

Titulescu pursued these

policies under regimes of varying commitments to democracy and in
international environments ranging from overtly hostile to
'
. 1 y blenign.
suppert ive

H'is po 1·icies
'
l't'ics.
were a b ave part y poi

I

His was a highly structured inclusivist policy which assumed
Romania's placl as a European nation and each state's
responsibilitylfor an indivisible peace. 11

It is more than

coincidence th t Foreign Minister Nastase, a respected
I
international !egal scholar in his own right, is President of the
Nicolae Titule1cu Foundation and often justifies current policies
and aspiration1 as having their inspiration in those of his
interwar predebessor. 12

Without dismissing the validity of the

former interprLtation of post-revolutionary Romanian national

-
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security policy, the remainder of this essay will assume the
accuracy of the latter interpretation.
As in the 1930s, among the most thorny national security
issues facing Romania are its relations with the Soviet Union and
Hungary.

An imposed common ideology no longer silences mutual

animosities.

Centuries of territorial disputes and interethnic

conflict characterize Romanian-Russian and Romanian-Hungarian
relations, the foci of which are Bessarabia (the Moldovan
Republic) and Transylvania.
areas.

Romanian majorities inhabit both

The Moldovan Republic is precariously independent but

still under some control by what is left of the u.s.S.R. and
Transylvania is part of Romania.

Similar ethnic tensions are the

grist of East Central Europe's new nationalist politics. 13

All

the region's governments officially abjure territorial revision,
rendered problematic by the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE), while at
the same time they all retain some level of "interest" in their
co-nationals living in neighboring countries.
In early April, 1991, Presidents Iliescu and Gorbachev
signed a Romanian-Soviet Treaty of Cooperation, Good
Neighborliness and Friendship.

In its vagueness the treaty

resembles a very brief draft treaty initialed by Titulescu and
Maxim Litvinov in July, 1936.

Negotiated without consultation

with the NSF's opposition and with only limited contact with the
Moldovan government, the new treaty was harshly criticized by
Western analysts and domestic opponents of the NSF alike. 14

-
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The

government, accused of selling out Romanian national interests as
well as the aspirations of the Moldovan people, somewhat lamely
refuted its critics.

In fact, as Vladimir Secor points out,

Romania's need for Soviet raw materials, purchased on a barter
rather than on a hard currency basis, may have hastened the
conclusion of a poorly drafted treaty. 15

Indeed, as of November,

1991, the treaty had not been submitted to the Romanian
parliament for ratification and both President Iliescu and
Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ionel Sandulescu were calling
for its renegotiation in light of the rapid disintegration of the
u.s.s.R. 16

The NSF government responded quickly and correctly in

August, 1991, condemning the Moscow putsch and earning the praise
of the West. 17

Whatever is left of the Soviet Union is [are]

likely to remain Romania's most important trading partner[s] and
to be the essential third party [parties] in the hoped for
reunification of Bessarabia, and, less likely, Northern Bukovina,
with the rest of Romania.

The treaty, regardless of its

manifestly poor preparation and shortsightedness, temporarily and
incompletely normalized relations with the U.S.S.R. and served as
the vehicle for high level Romanian contacts with officials from
Russia and Ukraine.
The process of normalization is more difficult with Hungary.
In Budapest the plight of Romania's Hungarian minority is the
crux of bilateral relations.

All other bilateral issues are

dependent upon its favorable settlement.
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Bucharest, on the other

hand, maintains that minority issues should be addressed
multilaterally within the CSCE and United Nations contexts. 18
Each country's extreme right manipulates mutual animosities,
making it difficult for either government to appear willing to
compromise.

Still, some "confidence building" measures have been

agreed upon, notably an "open skies" convention signed in May,
1991.

'Romania and Hungary also exchanged drafts of a bilateral

treaty of cooperation and friendship although its actual
negotiation will not likely follow quickly. 19

These positive

steps are drowned out by the din of nationalist rhetoric which
tends to polarize Romanians and Hungarians and to obscure their
economic and political community of interests the mutual
recognition of which might lead to Titulescu's vision of a
"spiritualization" of the frontier.

Additionally, Hungary's

participation in the Pentagonale and Visegrad groupings and their
refusal of Romanian requests to join them is interpreted in
Bucharest as a Hungarian attempt to prolong Romania's isolation.
By and large the Romanian opposition {with the obvious exception
of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania) is as antiHungarian as the NSF, making it improbable that a change in
government would positively affect bilateral relations.
Titulescu counseled patience, step-by-step confidence building,
and reliance on international law and organizations in interwar
Romania's relations with Hungary.

-
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post-revolutionary Romanian government is trying, albeit
nervously, to follow his advice.
Arrangements structuring bilateral relations with the
U.S.S.R. and Hungary might be labeled "pre-emptive" because of
the potential threats to Romania's political sovereignty,
territorial integrity and social stability which they have
historically represented.

Bilateral relations with other states

might more easily be classified as "supportive" or "symbolic" in
that they increase Romania's capabilities militarily,
diplomatically or economically or they enhance Romania's
international prestige.

Relations with Bulgaria, Turkey and

Yugoslavia are normal, even close.

Contacts with Czechoslovakia

and Poland are only slightly less cordial.

Bilateral relations

with the Western European states improved as the events of March
and June, 1990, faded from the media.

In this respect French

President Mitterand's isolation-breaking April, 1991, visit to
Bucharest, his pledge of French economic and political support,
and his signing, with President Iliescu, of a bilateral treaty of
friendly understanding and cooperation in November, 1991, were
significant events.w

Supportive political and economic relations

with Western Europe are essential if Romania is to achieve a
minimum of economic and political security.

Prime Minister

Roman's March tour and President Iliescu•s July visits to Latin
American are more symbolic than supportive but they underscore
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the "Latin connection" which has yielded positive results in
supportive relations with France, Italy and Spain.
European multilateral relations have evolved on both
continental and regional levels.

Because of its desperate need

for economic assistance, its isolation following the June events,
and Hungary's successful courting of European opinion on the
minority issue, a symbolic readmission to Europe was sought and
received when, following the release of the Romanian parliament's
reports on the Tirgu Mure~ and Bucharest events21 , the Council of
Europe granted Romania special guest status.n

Shortly thereafter

the European Parliament ratified the commercial and cooperation
agreement Romania had negotiated with the EEC in 1990.n

As part

of this package Romania gained access to PHARE (Economic
Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary} and Group of 24
financial assistance which, when coupled with Romania's initial
48 million ECU stake in the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, represented Western Europe's commitment to Romania's
economic security.u
At the regional level Romania's proposals for multilateral
arrangements differ from those of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and
Poland.

While it supported the dissolution of both the Warsaw

Pact and the CMEA~, the Romanian government conceded that a
security vacuum had been created in the process.

Taking a cue

from Titulescu's support of Louis Barthou•s Eastern Pact (1934},
in April, 1991, Foreign Minister Nastase proposed the creation of
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an inclusive Central and East European Union, patterned on the
model of the West European Union and open to observers from the
United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

Nastase's

aim was clear:
• . • our idea is to set up a forum for political
consultation to avoid fragmentation into little
subregional groups which would eventually increase
competitiveness among the region's countries and
further add to the existing tensions, instead of
ensuring greater stability • • • • the aim is to set up
a forum for political consultations which would not
have a military dimension . • . • This formula would
only be temporary, until the establishment of a panEuropean security system. 26
Nastase•s proposal, as well as a variation directly subordinating
a similar commission to CSCEv, was aimed at undermining the
Visegrad group, which had curtly rejected Romaniais bid for
inclusion28 , and the somewhat less objectionable Pentagonale.
Romania perceives these groupings as threatening its equal access
to the West and thus as potentially negative influences on
national security. 29
Romania itself had led the effort for post-revolutionary
Balkan cooperation but had been stymied by its potential
partners' inability to settle their long standing disputes; had
proposed the idea of a primarily economic Danubian grouping with
a reunited Germany and the soviet Union as the axes; and, had
supported the Turkish proposal for a Black Sea economic zone. 30
All of these initiatives, as President Iliescu underscored in his
speech to the United General Assembly (October 3, 1990), were
subordinated to the CSCE process from which a pan-European
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security system should emerge. 31

Each one of these groupings,

like Titulescu's Balkan and Little Ententes, would be open to all
region's states, provided that each member subscribed to their
basic purposes (i.e., economic collaboration and the CSCE
security framework), in sharp contrast with the Visegrad and
Pentagonale groupings which are patently exclusive.

Exclusive

groupings tend to increase the security apprehensions of nonmembers whereas inclusive groupings distribute membership
benefits in accordance with mutually reassuring agreements.
Romania's escape from isolation following the image-damaging
events of 1990 was not only a function of time but also of
circumstance.

When Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait

Romania's ambassador to the United Nations, Aurel Drago~
Munteanu, was just assuming his duties as President of the
Security Council.

For the next month the world watched a

Romanian diplomat presiding over the United Nations' most
determined enforcement of collective security since the Korean
War.

The international community's favorable impression of

Romania's commitment to the United Nations was also bolstered by
Bucharest's potential loss of up to $3 billion in refining
revenues and in defaulted Iraqi loans and by the dispatch of
Romanian medical units to the Saudi desert. 32

Echoing Titulescu's

willingness to sacrifice Romanian interests at the time of the
Abyssinian crisis, President Iliescu promised Romania's
continuing commitment to the United Nations Charter, precisely
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because a fully functioning global collective security system
would be the surest guarantee of Romanian national security. 33

As

a result of Romania's regaining of some international
respectability and complementing Europe's commitments to
Romania's economic reconstruction, loans and credits were granted
by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and Japan.~
Foreign investment in Romania doubled in 1991 and, in October,
the United states restored Romania's most favored nation status. 35
These international commitments to Romania's economic security
remain fragile as the initial foreign reaction to the September,
1991, miners' rampage in Bucharest demonstrated. 36

Irrespective

of Romania's foreign policy, as long as the domestic political
environment remains unstable and as long as democratization
proceeds at a snail's pace, international and European lenders
and investors will remain cautious in their assessments of
Romania's creditworthiness, perhaps, thereby, exacerbating the
very economic conditions which cause the instability and hinder
democratization.
The events of March and June, 1990, had unlocked the
international community's embrace of revolutionary Romania and
had reimposed the isolation to which Ceau9 escu had condemned the
country.

While the international media remains less than

sympathetic to the errors and hardships of democratization37 , by
June, 1991, Romania was again an increasingly active member of
the international community.

The partial escape from imposed
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isolation was the product of a structured approach to external
threats to and supports for the Romanian government's national
security priorities and was accomplished at bilateral,
multilateral and global levels by diplomats of talent.
Unfortunately, as Foreign Minister N~stase has repeatedly pointed
out, such diplomats are too few in number and the Foreign
Ministry is grossly underfunded, some embassies making due with a
fraction of their farmer staffs. 38
External guarantees of security, however desirable, are not
a substitute for domestic capabilities, nor, in a postrevolutionary situation, are external threats usually as
dangerous as domestic instability.

The sources of Romanian

instability are not difficult to detect:

a floundering economy,

including inflation and unemployment; a disruptive opposition
convinced that it has the right to govern with or without an
electoral mandate; ethnic minority protests and extreme
nationalist reaction; and, a plummeting confidence in political,
economic and social institutions. 39
The proposed national security law identifies the Romanian
Intelligence Service (RIS), the Ministry of National Defense, the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice as those,

i

government agencies with responsibilities for national securi~y. 40
l

In the absence of domestic stability and in the presence of
perceived external threats, these agencies are the primary
internal components of Romania's national security system.
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Td
I

be

effective they must be adequately equipped, trained and led and,
more importantly, they must be invested with the public's faith
in their ability to fulfill their assigned functions.
That faith is compromised by lingering doubts about the
military's role in the revolution of December, 1989.

General

Victor Stanculescu, the former Minister of Defense, maintains
that the army never fired upon the people, either in Timi~oara or
in Bucharest. 41

General Stefan Guse, who was with stanculescu and

General Mihai Chitac (Minister of the Interior at the time of the
June, 1990, miners' rampage) in Timi~oara from December 17 to 22,
is not quite as categorical but maintains that the army presence
in Timi~oara was justified by solid intelligence on foreign
involvement in the unrest.~

General Iulian Vlad, the chief of

state Security at the time of the revolution, identifies the
foreign agitators as Hungarians supported by the Soviet Union and
the United States.~

This web of denials and excuses is

complicated by the infamous interview granted to Adevarul (August
23, 1990) in which Silviu Brucan and General Nicolae Militaru
attempted to expropriate the revolution and give it to a shadowy
Military Resistance Committee, allegedly led by Militaru and
composed of other generals in forced retirement.~

Herein lies

the army hierarchy's continuing credibility problem.

No one

denies that major army units, commanded by courageous junior
officers, joined the revolutionaries and bore the brunt of the
fight against the Ceau~escu loyalists.
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still to be determined is

whether the army hierarchy, all of whom, active and retired, owed
their positions to Ceau~escu, were the leaders or the followers
in the army's actions.
Indeed, General Militaru•s inability to persuade the
democratic officers of his commitment to the revolution was the
cause of his dismissal as Minister of Defense at the end of
January, 1990. 45

His replacement was Colonel General Victor

Stanculescu who purged the most outspokenly democratic officers,
organized as the Action Committee for the Democratization of the
Army (CADA).

He made no apologies for getting rid of a "handful"

of officers "who violated some basic rules of military life." 46
These violations apparently included questioning the democratic
credentials of the largely unchanged army hierarchy.
General Stanculescu may also have raised the suspicions of
at least part of the NSF leadership.

As Minister of Defense he

was outspokenly nationalistic:
To let ourselves [be] dragged in[to] total
culpability [for the Ceau~escu dictatorship] without
discernment means • • • to play the game of those who
want to bring the Romanian people to [their] knees in
[their] own country so that they may dictate the policy
[we] should pursue, a policy intended to serve foreign
interests. 47
He also claimed the military•s unique right to define military
policy and doctrine. 48

He proclaimed that the army must be above

politics in order that it not be used as an instrument of
government repression.~

These insinuations of autonomy for the

military appear to contradict the provisions of the two
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organizational laws on national defense passed by the Romanian
parliament. 50

In March, 1991, a poll revealed that the army was

the government institution in which the sample expressed the most
confidence. 51

The army's sponsorship of the rehabilitation of

Marshal Ion Antonescu, another general who had "saved" a Romania
beset by external and internal foes 52 , and the adoption of many of
Stanculescu•s positions by the neo-Ceau~escist extreme right" may
have motivated Prime Minister Roman's transfer of Stanculescu to
the Ministry of Industry (April 29, 1991) where his reputation
was bound to suffer.

Indeed, even as the miners again subjected

Bucharest to their unwelcome and violent presence in September,
1991, stanculescu•s name was mentioned as a potential _prime
minister and his participation in what eventually became the
government headed by Theodor stolojan was rumored to have been
yet another bone of contention between President Iliescu and
outgoing Prime Minister Petre Roman.~
Stanculescu•s successor as Minister of Defense is Major
General Constantin Spiroiu, whose relative youth, 55, and
technical background partially distance him from association with
Ceau~escu.

Almost immediately Spiroiu set about rejuvenating the

hierarchy, naming a 48 year-old as Chief of Staff.

Spiroiu also

promised to release a documented report on the army's involvement
in the revolution and quoted King Ferdinand(!) regarding the
army's proper role in society.

He has echoed Stanculescu•s

concern about the army's preparedness, advocating a professional

-

20 -

core and conscript ranks; and about the armed forces' equipment,
promising to reinvigorate the defense industry. 55

While he

concedes the emptiness of "the whole nation's war" doctrine, he
has endorsed the concept of a purely defensive war with the
participation of territorial units. 56

Perhaps because of his

relative youth, Spiroiu claims to have a better rapport with his
democratically oriented younger officers to whom, he has stated,
he listens respectfully.~

Most importantly, the new Minister of

Defense, whose mandate was renewed in the Stolojan government,
rules out the army's intervention in politics, with one caveat:
To my mind, the Army's assuming a role in
governing the country is out of the question. We
consider that the army should remain politically
neutral. But it should be an element of stability, a
warrantor of independence, of territorial unity and
integrity, of the order of law, when this is beyond the
possibilities of the bodies with attributions on this
line. In such moments the Army too, has to take action
according to the law, to ensure the constitutional
order of law and only that. 58
The NSF now appears to have an unthreatening Minister of Defense
who will implement its, not his own, policies.

It remains to be

seen if the opposition will view him as favorably.
During the first two years of post-revolutionary turmoil the
army has been used sparingly and never violently against the
Romanian people despite devastating strikes, disrupting
demonstrations and the manifest failure of the other forces of
order to prevent wholesale corruption and endemic criminality.
Two of Stanculescu•s pronouncements sum up this risk aversive
posture toward domestic crises:
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. • • the armv has not
. and will never fire on its own
peop 1 e ••
~

• • • the army's duty is to defend the country from
outside enemies. Concerning domestic enemies, the task
of the powers that be is to organize the Ministry of
the Interior so well that .it can ensure the quietude
and safety of all citizens.®
In terms of use of the armed forces against external
enemies, both Stanculescu and Spiroiu have decried the Romanian
army's technological backwardness, the result of Ceau~escu•s
policies of self-reliance. 61

Despite promising contacts with

Western sources as well as with those of the former Soviet bloc62 ,
the military budget of only half a billion dollars does not augur
well for foreign supplied technological modernization.~

Even so,

the most probable external adversary, Hungary, is little better
off.

Thus, it is doubtful that, with the exception of the

unthinkable event of a Hungarian invasion, the Romanian armed
forces are capable of defending Romanian security from either
external or internal threats.
The Ministry of the Interior has two militarized forces, the
police {formerly the militia) and the gendarmerie• {formerly the
uniformed troops of the Ministry).

Few institutions under the

"ancien regime" were as corrupt as the militia.

The common

suspicion remains that ail policemen are for sale.

Former

Interior Minister Doru Viorel Ursu conceded that changing the
public image of the police, as well as the corrupt behavior of
the police themselves, will be a prolonged process.M

The

gendarmes have more direct responsibility for insuring public

-
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order, as opposed to controlling criminal activity. 65

Neither of

these forces is respected by the people and, judging by the level
of crime and the number of public disruptions, neither is an
effective force for achieving domestic security.

In partial

recognition of this poor perception of the police forces, as well
as their own poor self-image, Prime Minister Stolojan recruited
Victor Babiuc, a respected jurist and Minister of Justice in
Roman's government, to be Minister of the Interior in the
aftermath of the police's unusually inept handling of the miners'
September, 1991, invasion of Bucharest.

Babiuc pledged to start

the process of demilitarization of the police and to build its
professionalism and confidence.M
The most hated and feared component of Ceau 9 escu•s apparatus
of oppression was the "Securitate."

"Securitate" loyalists were

allegedly the perpetrators of most of the violence during the
revolution.

Immediately after the revolution the "Securitate"

passed to the control of the Ministry of Defense which retained
its material assets.

On April 24, 1990, the Romanian

Intelligence Service {RIS) was established, allegedly employing
only 6000 of the 15,000 "Securitate" personnel at the time of the
revolution.~

RIS's mission is to identify and track threats to

Romania's security at home and abroad. 68

These tasks recall the

official missions of Ceau 9 escu•s "Securitate" and generate much
concern and distrust.

While it is difficult to assess the

success of an organization which is inherently publicity shy, the
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relative ease with which political opponents of the regime have
been rounded up would suggest that the RIS is capable of
fulfilling its assigned tasks domestically.
Revelations, such as the continuing profitability of
"Securitate" commercial fronts 69 and the decision to seal
"Securitate" files for forty years70 do nothing to quell the
public's suspicions that

11

securi 9 ti" are merely biding their

time, patiently awaiting the moment to resume their "rightful"
place in a neo-authoritarian state.

During the September, 1991,

crisis conspiracy theories involving RIS (i.e., "Securitate")
manipulation of the miners were plentiful. 71

Further, unlike

Interior Minister Ursu•s and Defense Minister Spiroiu•s
parliamentary accounts of their forces' activities during the
violence, RIS Director Virgil Magureanu•s report was highly
politicized and totally "exculpatory. 1172

His tone and less than

satisfactory explanations were apparently enough to cause
outgoing Prime Minister Petre Roman to call for Magureanu•s
replacement with an "authentically democratic personality. 1173
still, Magureanu stayed on and the RIS was given statutory
structure and legitimacy in November, 1991.

It is widely

believed that the RIS director's relationship with President
Iliescu and the conservative faction of the NSF is a close one
and that these forces used the RIS to rid the government of Roman
and the NSF "reformers."

-
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The Romanian government equates national security with the
maintenance of an interdependent, inclusive and supportive
network of international guarantees of Romania's territorial
integrity and political sovereignty and with a stable domestic
environment in which the government may pursue gradual economic
and political reforms.

Romania's economic and political weakness

is so great, its legacy of isolation and inept management of its
national security assets so burdensome that neither its foreign
nor its domestic environments offer encouraging prospects for
achieving the government's desired level of security.
At the heart of the matter is the incompatibility of the
government's pace, and particularly President Iliescu's vision,
of reform and both the international community's and Romanian
society's willingness to forswear contradictory political and
economic agendas.

Additionally, the traditional

instrumentalities for compensating for these discrepancies are
neither capable of fulfilling their functions nor invested with
the requisite public trust to render their maintenance of order
legitimate.

Only the complete reform of the economic and

political systems, perhaps realizable in the full implementation
of the stolojan reform program, in the adoption of a truly
democratic constitution, and in genuinely free elections held in
early 1992, will produce the domestic stability and the
international support required for the achievement of Romanian
national security.
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